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The purpose of this study was to understand how a single pair of expert individual
rowers experienced their crew functioning in natural conditions when asked to practice
a joint movement for the first time. To fulfill this objective, we conducted a field study
of interpersonal coordination that combined phenomenological and mechanical data
from a coxless pair activity, to analyze the dynamics of the (inter)subjective experience
compared with the dynamics of the team coordination. Using an enactivist approach to
social couplings, these heterogeneous data were combined to explore the salience (and
accuracy) of individuals’ shared experiences of their joint action. First, we determined
how each rower experienced the continuous crew functioning states (e.g., feelings
of the boat’s glide). Second, the phenomenological data helped us to build several
categories of oar strokes (i.e., cycles), experienced by the rowers as either detrimentally
or effectively performed strokes. Third, the mechanical signatures that correlated with
each phenomenological category were tracked at various level of organization (i.e.,
individual-, interpersonal-, and boat-levels). The results indicated that (a) the two rowers
did not pay attention to their joint action during most of the cycles, (b) some cycles were
simultaneously lived as a salient, meaningful experience of either a detrimental (n = 15
cycles) or an effective (n = 18 cycles) joint action, and (c) the mechanical signatures
diverged across the delineated phenomenological categories, suggesting that the way
in which the cycles were experienced emerged from the variance in some mechanical
parameters (i.e., differences in peak force level and mean force). Notably, the mechanical
measures that helped to explain differences within the phenomenological categories
were found at the interpersonal level of analysis, thus suggesting an intentional inter-
personal mode of regulation of their joint action. This result is further challenged and
discussed in light of extra-personal regulation processes that might concurrently explain
why participants did not make an extensive salient experience of their joint action. We
conclude that attempts to combine phenomenological and mechanical data should be
pursued to continue the research on how individuals regulate the effectiveness of their
joint actions’ dynamics.
Keywords: mixed method, enaction, interpersonal coordination, extrapersonal coordination, rowing, course of
action, subjectivity-based sampling method
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INTRODUCTION
Joint action is a ubiquitous phenomenon underlying most daily
activities, especially when interpersonal sensorimotor coupling is
involved. Joint action has been abundantly investigated in human
movement science using kinematics descriptions (Schmidt and
O’Brien, 1997; Romero et al., 2012), and to a lesser extent by
describing the embodied perceptive (and/or subjective) activities
implied in its active regulation (Laroche et al., 2014). In
the mainstream research on joint action, most studies that
have involved the participants’ lived (i.e., subjective) experience
of ongoing team coordination have been controlled by the
experimental instructions given to the participants.
The first part of this stream of research has considered
the role of the participant’s lived concerns by focusing on the
intentional features (i.e., the participant’s explicit experience of
regulating his behavior) underlying the regulatory mechanisms.
Typically, pairs of participants were asked to coordinate their
oscillating legs (alternately in phase and anti-phase patterns)
and to actively/explicitly regulate the coordination so that the
emergent states of synchrony/asynchrony perceived on the fly
would remain stable overtime (Schmidt et al., 1990). This study
has been compared to a companion one in which participants
instead were asked to remain aware of their lived experience
of comfort and to regulate their behavior accordingly. The
comparison of both types of awareness showed that the degree of
active perceptive regulation was a critical process that controlled
the fluctuations and phase transitions within the emerging team
coordination states. Such observations particularly illustrate how
a change in the subjective regulation of the participants (i.e.,
being more or less active or/and explicit to them) might shape
the biomechanical signatures of the ongoing joint action.
The second part of the research has focused on the
unperceived aspects underpinning the dynamics of team
coordination, which form the behavioral facet of the coordination
that is meaningless to the participants. To illustrate, Schmidt
and O’Brien (1997) asked participants, placed in pairs, to
avoid synchronous oscillations while swinging a pendulum with
their arms. They observed that the participants were able to
prevent this coordination from occurring only in the absence of
informational exchanges (i.e., not mutually visible). Otherwise,
and despite the instruction of avoiding synchronization, a
tendency to phase-lock emerged when the participants were
informationally coupled (i.e., they were able to perceive each
other’s moves). Such study highlights how implicit features (i.e.,
an absence of awareness of the emerging team coordination
states) shape the action and perception loop underlying joint
action. In doing so, this study questions both the way in which
actors might be aware of their ongoing interaction, and the way
in which explicit/meaningful regulation is shaped by processes
similar to unintentional/unperceived coordination.
While some researchers call for investigating the lived
experience of the actors as an important part of the joint action
process itself (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007), very few studies
have considered the awareness and the sense-making activity of
the actors as a valuable topic for research (Gallagher, 2009; De
Jaegher et al., 2010; Froese and Di Paolo, 2010). Yet, empirical
evidence has shown that with increasing expertise, actors are
more likely to use lived experience to actively regulate the
dynamics of the joint action (Schiavio and Høffding, 2015). In
this light, thanks to their study of team rowing coordination in
a natural setting, Lund et al. (2012) suggested that participants
learned to coordinate by gradually and systematically adjusting
their shared experiences over time. As claimed by Heath et al.
(2002), such an active regulation by actors in organizational
settings is enable by a skillful use of their lived experience to
monitor the ongoing team coordination of which they are part.
However, very little evidence has been provided of the salience
and accuracy of such an online awareness in either human
movement science or sports science. Together, these elements
demonstrate that the way joint movement is experienced remains
a neglected topic within joint action research.
A recent study carried out on the sport field selected rowing
as a setting to describe how athletes experienced their activity
and the accuracy of their awareness (Millar et al., 2015). While
the study investigated coordination phenomena only at an
intrapersonal scale, it gave insights into the role of the online lived
experience of actors in regulating their action and perception
dynamics. In particular, the study suggested that with increased
expertise, the rowers are more likely to be aware of the ongoing
changes within the performance states (i.e., change in boat
speed), even more than their coaches are from their external
point of view. This study thus illustrates how expert performers
might be able reliably to live and account for their dynamical
individual activity. However, it is still unknown whether expert
individual performers exhibit the same salient awareness of
their activity when involved in a joint action task. In this light,
investigations of phenomenological phenomena are still needed
in the research on joint action processes. Quite novel in the field,
the present study was exploratory and described the systematic
lived experience of participants regarding their joint movement.
The study was conducted in a natural setting of rowing. By
combining phenomenological data with behavioral data (i.e.,
mechanical measures) and by using an original methodological
design, we aimed to discuss the ways in which humans actively
manage their emerging experience of the team coordination
states.
The present study was designed with respect for an enactivist
approach to social couplings (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007;
Laroche et al., 2014) to address the extent to which actors had
shared meaningful lived experiences through the joint movement
behavioral states. By combining a phenomenological description
of their activity with a behavioral description, we aimed to explore
the accuracy of such experiences.
The enactivist view to social couplings assumes that joint
action processes should be investigated by reconstructing the way
in which individuals live in their own worlds that are mutually
coupled. Such a joint sense-making activity is assumed precarious
in that individuals sense-making activities shape and are shaped
by the fluctuating dynamics of the behavioral facet of the
coupling to which they are contributing. An enactivist approach
to the analysis of joint action thus aims to describe how the
behavioral facet of the social coupling needs to complement the
(inter)subjective facet in which it is embedded. This framework
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aims to contribute to a paradigm shift in cognitive science
(Varela, 1979), as the researchers present a non-representational
frameworks in social cognition science (e.g., Varela, 1979; Varela
et al., 1991). Instead of rejecting the subjectivity of participants
(i.e., as in some of the non-representationalist views of cognition),
the enactivist approach conceives it as a main component
in the active regulation of the situated embodied activity.
Thus, following a careful phenomenological framework (e.g.,
Theureau, 2003), the enactivist approach considers the “own
world” of humans as the product of (a) the nature of their
sensory apparatus that is genetically inherited, (b) the history
of the actor/environment coupling (e.g., recurrent patterns of
perception and action built during individual development), and
(c) the way in which individual experiences his/her coupling with
the environment in the moment (Thompson, 2011). This last
assumption makes the situated experience lived by each of the
performers the sine qua non condition for describing how their
behaviors are systematically arranged into dynamic patterns in
their real-time activity.
The present field study of joint action in a rowing crew
combined the data from two alternative research traditions
within activity analysis: the dynamics of the lived experience and
the dynamics of the behavior. These data have been combined
with a view to explore how individual lived experiences are
tightly nested in the active regulation of joint action between
two elite performers who have not been trained to row together.
To explore the behavioral facet in which lived experiences are
dynamically anchored, our starting point was to determine
how each rower experienced the continuous coordination states
during their race. Such phenomenological data helped to
build several samples of oar strokes, differentially experienced.
Grounded on such a subjectivity-based sampling method (Lutz
et al., 2002), we then scrutinized the behavioral facet of the strokes
by characterizing the specific behavioral signatures underlying
the identified lived experiences, as captured at various levels
of analysis. The following research questions drove the present
study: (a) to what extent do individual coxless pair rowers
report salient, meaningful lived experiences of their joint action
effectiveness? (b) To what extent are these experiences similar
across rowers? (c) Are distinct shared lived experiences of
joint action effectiveness associated with distinct mechanical
signatures? Finally, (d) to what extent do shared lived experiences
of joint action effectiveness capture behavioral instances of expert
team coordination?
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Characteristics of the Setting under
Study
The naturalistic conditions of rowing (i.e., on water) have
been selected for investigating joint action and the related
shared lived experiences of rowers. Team coordination has been
shown to be one of the major performance factors in crews of
two or more rowers (Wing and Woodburn, 1995; Hill, 2002;
Smith and Draper, 2002; Baudouin and Hawkins, 2004). In
such an interactive performance setting, rowers are mutually
involved in a permanent real-time regulation of the emerging
behavioral states of team coordination (Pinder et al., 2011). Much
feedback is available for rowers during their race –they can feel
their teammate’s oar blade enter the water through the boat
movement, the boat’s roll, or their common propulsion, which
makes this setting also particularly attractive for exploring the
rowers’ lived experience (Millar et al., 2013). This abundance of
feedbacks is likely to produce a rich amount of sense-making
activity, although it may make it complex. Moreover, the existing
mechanical capture systems allow the collection of a large amount
of behavioral data in natural settings (i.e., on the water) at
different levels of the social system: individual level (e.g., forces,
angles measures; Ishiko, 1971; Schneider et al., 1978; Kleshnev,
2011); interpersonal level (e.g., time gaps in the entry into water
of the rowers’ oar; Sève et al., 2013) and the boat’s level (e.g.,
boat speed; Hill, 2002; Baudouin and Hawkins, 2004). Such a
setting offers a rich opportunity to advance the research on team
coordination in general and on multi-level approaches of joint
action in particular (Cooke et al., 2013; Kozlowski et al., 2013;
Humphrey and Aime, 2014; Bourbousson et al., 2015).
Participants and Procedure
A junior men’s coxless pair aged 17 years with 10 years’ experience
in rowing participated in this study with the collaboration of
their coach. The participants had no shared experience in rowing
coxless pair together (i.e., this was their first season rowing
together). The data collection occurred at the very first step of a
1-month crew-training period before the national championship
in which the pair were to perform together. Both participants
were current members of the French Rowing Academy (Nantes,
France). The “stroke rower” is seated on the closest seat to the
stern of the boat (i.e., he doesn’t see his teammate; see Figure 1)
and, as described in the rowing training theories (Lippens, 2005),
he propels the boat and set the rhythm. The “bow rower” is
seated on the first seat, near to the bow of the boat (i.e., he
sees the back of his teammate; see Figure 1) and he is supposed
to follow the movement of the stroke rower to coordinate with
him. Participants were in the top 10 of their category in France.
This study was performed in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki and the APA ethics guideline. It was approved by a
local Institutional Review Board of the university. The two rowers
and their coaches were informed of the procedures and gave their
consent.
The two coxless rowers conducted a 12-min race of sub-
maximal on-water rowing at 18–19 strokes per min (spm), as
intended for the analysis. Sub-maximal is considered to be at
70–75% of the participant’s fastest speed, with a heart rate is below
145–156 beats per minute (bpm). This race thus account for the
very first stage of team training, which was assumed to capture
the initial learning processes of a newly formed crew composed
of expert individual rowers.
Data Collection
Two distinct data sets were collected to account for the activity of
the two rowers during the race. First, the phenomenological data
were recovered through individual self-confrontation interviews
(Theureau, 2003) with each rower. Second, the behavioral data
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FIGURE 1 | Bird’s-eye view of a coxless pair. The onboard measurement system (Powerline, Peach Innovation) records the components of the forces applied by
the rowers to the oarlock along the x-axis (in the direction of the boat’s movement), the acceleration, the speed of the boat, and the angle formed by the oar with the
y-axis (perpendicular to the boat’s movement).
were recovered using an automatic mechanical device during the
race.
Phenomenological Data Collection
The actors’ phenomenology was the starting point for the
descriptions of the actor/environment coupling. This was
consistent with the enactivist view to social couplings and the
claim that human activity displays autonomous characteristics
that are not reducible to behavioral descriptions (Varela et al.,
1991). The enactivist approach therefore devotes special attention
to pre-reflective self-conscious phenomena, that is, the implicit
ways in which a given actor experiences his/her ongoing
activity. To capture actors’ phenomenology through their pre-
reflective self-consciousness embedded in the unfolding activity
(i.e., lived experience), our study included a methodology that
used phenomenological forms of retrospective interviews. From
this perspective, at each instant of the race under study,
we used self-confrontation interview techniques to collect the
phenomenological data that accounted for the pre-reflective self-
consciousness of the participants. This was consistent with recent
enactive studies in sports (Bourbousson et al., 2011, 2012; Poizat
et al., 2012; Sève et al., 2013; Bourbousson et al., 2015; Araujo and
Bourbousson, 2016).
To this end, each rower of the coxless pair was filmed
individually during the race by two video cameras located
in a second boat that followed the rowing boat. Each rower
was equipped with a high-fidelity microphone. Together, the
recordings allowed us to collect the rowers’ behaviors and
verbal communications. These behavioral traces of their activities
helped us conduct the individual self-confrontation interviews
immediately after the race. The self-confrontation interviews
were designed so that rowers were asked to “re-experience
their race” (i.e., re-enact their race) in order to describe and
comment on the very details of the dynamics of their lived
experience at each instant of the race (i.e., what they were
doing, feeling, thinking, perceiving; see Theureau, 2003, for
further details). Based on this verbalization data set, we were
able to further characterize how the participants experienced each
stroke. Each interview was fully recorded using a video camera
so we able transcribe the verbal data and synchronize the rower’s
verbalizations collected during the self-confrontation interview
with the corresponding oar strokes. Each individual interview
lasted 1 h.
Behavioral Data Collection
The behavioral data were obtained from collection of mechanical
data during the race using the Powerline system (Peach
Innovations, Cambridge, UK) at 50 Hz (Coker et al., 2009). This
system is imperceptible to rowers, thus allowing them to perform
in natural conditions, but in an instrumented boat. In line with
the study’s aim, the system has a data acquisition and storage
center connected to different sensors that allow to collect (a) the
force applied to the oarlock by each rower (i.e., in the direction of
the longitudinal axis of the boat), (b) the changes in each oar angle
in the horizontal plane (i.e., the angle formed by the oar with the
perpendicular axis to the longitudinal axis of the boat) and (c) the
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boat velocity and acceleration, via an accelerometer and a speed
sensor fixed under the middle of the boat’s shell (see Figure 1).
The accuracy of the force and angle sensors was 2% of full scale
(1500 N) and 0.5◦, respectively. The calibration of sensors was
carefully checked before the experiment. The “drive” portion of
a given stroke takes place in the water and propels the boat; it
begins with a minimum oar angle (i.e., the catch) and ends with
a maximum angle (i.e., the finish). Conversely, the “recovery”
reflects the portion of the stroke that occurs out of water (Hill,
2002).
Data Processing
Building the Individual Courses-of-Experience
To perform the empirical phenomenological description of the
crew joint action, we mobilized the course-of-action framework.
This framework is rooted in the enactivist approach, and it offers
valuable analytic tools to operationalize the phenomenological
claims of enactivism. Tightly linked to the phenomenology of
Sartre (1958), the course-of-action analytical approach includes
sophisticated accounts of the pre-reflective self-consciousness
reported by the participants, allowing for a step-by-step analysis
of the dynamics of the lived experience involved in the activity
under study (Theureau, 2003).
In this light, verbalization data obtained from the interviews
were fully transcribed and then synchronized in a Table 1. We
then systematically reconstructed the ‘course-of-experience’
of each rower during the race from the verbalization
data sets (Theureau, 2003) by identifying the chaining of
phenomenological experiential units across time. A course-of-
experience accounts for what is meaningful to the actor at each
instant of the race. Phenomenological experiential units chained
together over time thus provide a detailed description of the
dynamics for a given actor. Considering the hypothesis of the
course-of-action framework, a phenomenological experiential
unit does not directly result from the verbalization data, but
is built by the researcher based on this data. The researcher
identifies the six components of each phenomenological
experiential unit (i.e., the so-called hexadic sign, Theureau, 2003)
that are assumed to merge at a given instant to form what the
participant lives intrinsically as a syncretic experience. A given
phenomenological experiential unit lasts until another unit
begins from the point of view of the actor; its duration thus
depends on the intrinsic sense-making dynamics of the rower.
For instance, in the present study, the delineated units were
close to the duration of an oar stroke (or shorter), reflecting the
importance of each cycle in experiencing the race.
The first component of a phenomenological experiential
unit refers to a current action [i.e., Action (A)], defined as
the fraction of activity that the individual can show, tell, or
comment on at a given moment. This component is the closest
to the syncretic experience of the actor in the situation. It
is assumed to emerge as a physical action, a communicative
exchange, or an interpretative act. The researcher identified this
component within the verbalization data sets by determining
what the participant was doing and what he was thinking.
The second component refers to the current involvement [i.e.,
Involvement in the situation (I)], defined as the individual’s
concerns at a given moment. This component was identified
within the verbalization data sets by identifying the participant’s
significant concerns in relation to the specific situation. The third
component refers to current expectations [i.e., Expectations (E)],
defined as what is expected by the individual in the situation
at a given moment. It was identified within the verbalization
data sets by identifying the participant’s expectations about the
current situation arising from his concerns and from the previous
events in the setting (e.g., what result he/she was anticipating).
The fourth component refers to knowledge elements [i.e.,
prior mobilized Knowledge (K)], defined as the individual’s
past knowledge that is relevant to the current situation. This
component was identified within the verbalization data sets
by identifying the prior elements of knowledge used by the
participant. The fifth component refers to the perception [i.e.,
Perception (P)], defined as elements of the situation significant
to the individual at a given moment. It was identified within
the verbalization data sets by identifying what the participant
considered to be a meaningful element of the situation. The sixth
component refers to the construction, validation, or invalidation
of knowledge, defined as the component of activity that modifies
elements of knowledge at a given moment [i.e., Refashioned
Knowledge (RK)]. This component was identified within the
verbalization data sets by identifying what knowledge was being
constructed, validated, or invalidated by the participant at the
considered instant. For further details on the method or the
framework, see Theureau (2003). Table 1 provides an example
of each of these components [i.e., Action (A), Involvement in the
situation (I), Expectations (E), prior mobilized Knowledge (K),
Perception (P), and Refashioned Knowledge (RK)].
To enhance the coding process validity, the first, second,
and the last author (who had already coded protocols of this
type in earlier studies) randomly selected a 2-min sequence
of activity for a crossed analysis. At this step, each researcher
independently built the course-of-experience of each rower,
and then compared their codes to identify disagreements.
Any of these initial disagreements were resolved by discussion
among the researchers, who debated their interpretations until
a consensus was reached on the number of phenomenological
experiential units and the contents of the six components of
each unit. After this consensus was reached, the first author
reconstructed the dynamics of the lived experience of each rower
during the complete race. Remaining verbalization data that
were doubtful or unclear were collectively re-processed. Then,
the phenomenological experiential units were further aggregated
to be processed through a thematic analysis of qualitative data
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). The starting point of the thematic
analysis was to characterize how each rower experienced each oar
stroke in terms of joint action effectiveness (e.g., similarity of their
sensation about the boat’s glide, or about their global perception
about the boat/crew functioning). This characterization was
based on in a detailed examination of the six components of
each phenomenological experiential unit, so that the extent to
which rowers experienced joint action effectiveness was identified
by the researcher in a comprehensive analysis of each instant of
the race (see Supplementary Image 1). Such an analysis allowed
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the researcher to decide how the rower experienced the joint
action effectiveness, even if the rower was unable to detail such an
experience in an explicit way. We were able to identify different
individual typical modes of experiencing joint action effectiveness
(i.e., from experiencing an effective to a detrimental joint action).
From this local analysis, the first-order themes related to the joint
action effectiveness experience were then merged step-by-step to
give rise to second-order themes (see Braun and Clarke, 2006,
for further details), which were the so-called typical modes of
experiencing joint action effectiveness. Once these themes had
been identified, each phenomenological experiential unit was
labeled according to the theme to which it belonged, so that the
chaining of the typical modes of experience might be analyzed
across time.
After identifying and labeling the phenomenological
experiential units, the next step consisted in time synchronizing
the rowers’ typical experiences. Such synchronization allowed
scrutinizing the extent to which rowers simultaneously and
similarly experienced the effectiveness of their joint action
during the ongoing performance. At this step, typical
arrangements of the modes of experience were scrutinized
which allowed us to delineate portions of joint action dynamics
(i.e., phenomenological data samples) that were congruent (or
not) with the related lived experiences. The aim of the following
next step was to search for the mechanical signatures of such
delineated phenomenological data samples.
Computing Mechanical Indicators at Various Levels
of Description
Mechanical indicators were calculated for each rower’s stroke
to account for individual-, interpersonal-, and boat-levels of
description. These indicators were analyzed for each full oar
stroke. Each stroke was decomposed into four phases to better
assess changes within the mechanical signatures, specifically,
the first and second halves of the drive phase (i.e., during the
propulsive phase; when the oar was in water) and the first and
second halves of the recovery phase (i.e., during the replacement
phase; when the oar was out of water). Raw data (oar angles,
forces applied to the oarlocks, acceleration and velocity) were
filtered with a low pass Butterworth filter, with a 5 Hz cutoff
frequency. Continuous angular velocities were then computed
as the first derivative of the angular position, using the central
difference formula. The continuous relative phase between oar
angles of the stroke and the bow rower was selected to assess
the interpersonal coordination (de Brouwer et al., 2013) and
was calculated according to Hamill et al. (2000). Each cycle was
considered between catch points as the local minimum of oar
angle. Then, all the data were interpolated to 101 points per cycle.
As the stroke rower’s cycle did not start at exactly the same time
that the one of the bow rower’s, all studied rowing cycles were
normalized on the stroke rower’s cycle of oar stroke in order to
allow for the comparison between rowers.
Individual level of description
To account for the individual level of description of the
mechanical parameters, 11 indicators were selected: (a) the mean
of force applied by the rower to the pin of oarlock in the direction
of the longitudinal axis of the boat (N), (b) the standard deviation
of the force’s values (N), (c) the linear momentum of the force
produced (kg.m.s−1), (d) the peak force (N), (e) the peak force’s
timing in percentage of cycle (%), (f) the range of motion of the
rowers (◦), (g) the catch angle (◦), (h) the mean of the angle of oar
velocity (◦.s−1), and (i) the mean of the standard deviation of the
values of the oar’s angle of velocity (◦.s−1). Individual parameters
were selected from the literature of performance analysis in
rowing (Kleshnev, 2011).
Interpersonal level of description
To analyze the mechanical parameters at an interpersonal level of
description, seven indicators were retained, which all accounted
for a degree of synchrony of the oars strokes: (a) the mean of
the angle’s continuous relative phase (◦), (b) the mean of the
standard deviation of the angle’s continuous relative phase, (c)
the gap between the timing of either catch angles (%), (d) the
mean of the gap between each individual peak force level (N), and
(e) the gap between the timing of each individual peak force (%
of the cycle). These parameters were selected to account for the
level of synchrony between the angles of the rowers (Williams,
1967; Lamb, 1989; Hill, 2002) and between the exerted forces
(Schneider et al., 1978; Wing and Woodburn, 1995; Baudouin
and Hawkins, 2004).
Boat level of description
To account for the boat’s level of description, two indicators were
selected: the mean of the boat’s velocity (m.s−1) and the mean of
the boat’s acceleration (m.s−2).
Identifying the Mechanical Signatures of the Typical
Modes of Experience by a Subjectivity-Based
Sampling Method
To combine phenomenological and behavioral data (i.e.,
typical modes of experiencing the race and the mechanical
signatures at various levels of description), we performed a
subjectivity-based sampling procedure. The procedure involved
first scrutinizing the phenomenological data (i.e., the rowers’
course-of-experience) to delineate the samples of behavioral data
to be compared (i.e., various ways of experiencing the strokes
give rise to various delineated sections within the race that will be
further processed/compared). Such a subjectivity-based sampling
method has been well developed in enactivist neuroscience (e.g.,
Rodriguez et al., 1999; Lutz et al., 2002; Lutz and Thompson,
2003; Froese et al., 2014a,b). To our knowledge, this has not
been used in the field of human movement or sports science.
The principle is to guide the observational study (e.g., brain
dynamics observation, behavioral dynamics observation) using
phenomenological data collected during the same task. This
procedure includes the human experience as a valuable facet of
the activity under study and investigates the observational (i.e.,
behavioral) measures that contribute to their emergence.
To utilize this method, the time code of each typical mode
of experience was recorded (i.e., starting/ending point of the
given mode) to identify all intervals falling under the same
typical mode of experience, subsequently, we aggregated them
in a corresponding sample. Various samples of mechanical data
were built from this procedure (i.e., respecting the time codes
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of the typical modes of experience), each of them thus reflecting
different ways of experiencing the joint action. Each instant of the
joint action (i.e., each cycle) was further characterized in terms of
the similarity of the individual experiences of the rowers, using
the three individual modes of effectiveness experiences captured
during the thematic analysis of each participant’s activity. From
the collective level of description of the lived experiences,
we delineated four collective phenomenological categories (i.e.,
four samples) in our overall data set. Each of these categories
comprised mechanical indicators measured for each cycle under
consideration, resulting in multiple quantitative time series.
The first collective phenomenological category was labeled
Simultaneously and Similarly Experienced as Meaningless
(SSE-M). The second category was labeled Simultaneously
and Similarly Experienced as Detrimental (SSE-D). The
third category was labeled Simultaneously and Similarly
Experienced as Effective (SSE-E). The fourth category was
labeled Simultaneously Diverging Experiences (SDE).
Statistical analysis was carried out on the mechanical
signatures of each of the four categories using the SPSS 17.0
statistical software package (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Descriptive statistics were reported using the mean and the
standard deviation (mean ± SD). Differences between the four
categories regarding each mechanical indicator were analyzed
using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). When
the main effect was significant, ANOVA, or two-way ANOVA,
with Tukey’s HSD post hoc test was applied to the categories
(SSE-M, SSE-D, SSE-E, and SDE) and the rowers (Rower 1
and Rower 2) as independent variables and the mechanical
indicators listed above as dependent variables. Post hoc analyses
were applied with Bonferroni correction. Data and ANOVA
residuals were checked carefully for normal distribution using
QQ plots. When distributions were not normal, a Kruskal–Wallis
test was applied. When the Kruskal–Wallis tests were applied and
revealed significant effects, Dunn’s tests was applied, as Post hoc
analyses, to identify the location of differences between categories
(Dunn, 1961). The level of significance was set at p < 0.05.
RESULTS
Typical Individual Rowers’ Modes of
Experiencing the Joint Action
Effectiveness
The thematic analysis performed on the individuals’
phenomenological data showed that three main themes
(i.e., revealing typical modes of experience) fit the collected
data, suggesting three related recurrent ways of experiencing
joint action effectiveness from the individual rowers’ points of
view. The most prevalent typical mode of experience (75.5%
of the time of their individual activities) accounted for the
units of experience in which the joint action was experienced
as “meaningless” by the rower. “Meaningless” was used here
as a label to signify that the rower did not pay attention to
the joint action at the pre-reflective level of their activity. The
second and the third typical modes of experience accounted
for the units of experience in which the participant reported a
“salient” experience of the joint action. Especially, the second
typical mode (16.3% of the time of their individual activities)
accounted for portions of activity in which the rower reported a
salient, meaningful experience of contributing to an effective oar
stroke, indicating that the joint action was experienced as being
particularly “effective.” The third typical mode of experience
(8.2% of the time of their individual activities) accounted for
portions of activity in which the rower reported a salient,
meaningful experience of contributing to a poor oar stroke,
thus indicating that the joint action was experienced as being
“detrimental.”
Collective Phenomenological Categories
and Their Prevalence
The first collective phenomenological category was built by
aggregating the data related to all cycles (i.e., oar strokes)
that the participants simultaneously and similarly experienced
as being “meaningless” (N = 154 cycles out of 204 cycles,
representing 75.5% of the race). This category was labeled
SSE-M. The second category accounted for all cycles that the
participants simultaneously and similarly experienced as being
“detrimental” for the joint action (labeled SSE-D; N = 15 cycles;
representing 7.4% of the race). The third category accounted for
all cycles that were simultaneously and similarly experienced by
the participants as being “effective” for the joint action (labeled
SSE-E; N = 18 cycles; representing 8.8% of the race). The fourth
category accounted for all cycles that the rowers simultaneously
experienced in a diverging fashion, and it was labeled SDE
(N= 17 cycles; representing 8.3% of the race). See the illustration
in Figure 2.
Mechanical Signatures of the Collective
Phenomenological Categories at Three
Levels of Analysis
The mechanical parameters related to the four identified
categories (SSE-M, SSE-D, SSE-E, and SDE) were then submitted
for further statistical analysis. The analyses aimed to identify
the level of organization of the joint action (i.e., individual,
interpersonal, or boat-level of the mechanical parameters
analysis) that could at best explain the differences in the four
collective phenomenological categories. For all of the following
analyses, the comparison between the categories considered
seven ways of analyzing the cycles: (a) the full cycle, (b) the drive
phase, (c) the first half of the drive, (d) the second half of the drive,
(e) the full recovery phase, (f) the first half of the recovery, and (g)
the second half of the recovery.
Individual Level of Analysis
At the individual level of analysis, no significant differences
between collective phenomenological categories was found
in terms of individual mechanical indicators. The following
indicators were assessed and did not capture differences between
the categories: the mean force applied by the rower on the
pin of the oarlock, the standard deviation of the force’s
values, the linear momentum of the force produced, the
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FIGURE 2 | Representation of the prevalence of the collective
phenomenological categories during the race under study (in
percentages). The percentage is the ratio between the number of cycle in
each collective phenomenological category and the total number of cycle
recorded during the race. SSE-M, Joint action Simultaneously and Similarly
Experienced as Meaningless; SSE-D, Joint action Simultaneously and
Similarly Experienced as Detrimental; SSE-E, Joint action Simultaneously and
Similarly Experienced as Effective; SDE, Simultaneously Diverging Experiences
of joint action.
peak force level, the peak force’s timing in the percentage
of cycle, the range of motion of the rowers, the mean
of the angle of oar velocity, the mean of the standard
deviation of the values of the oar’s angle of velocity. See
Supplementary Tables S1–S3.
Interpersonal Level of Analysis
At the interpersonal level of analysis, the values of the relative
phase measures did not differ significantly between categories.
The main result at this level of analysis was related to the
measure of the gap between their peak force levels, which
was significantly higher for the SSE-D than for the other
collective phenomenological categories. Indeed, the Kruskal–
Wallis test revealed an effect between the categories (chi-
squared = 8.451; df = 3; p-value = 0.038), and Dunn’s
test then showed a significant difference between the SSE-
D and the SSE-E categories (adjusted p-value = 0.026; see
Figure 3). Thus, the measure of the gap between each
individual peak force level appeared to be the best candidate to
understand the mechanical parameters that supported a shared
experience of effectiveness in joint action. See Supplementary
Table S4.
Boat Level of Analysis
At the level of analysis of the boat, the results did not
show differences between the four collective phenomenological
categories for either of the indicators related to the boat, which
were the mean of the boat’s velocity and the boat’s acceleration.
See Supplementary Table S5.
DISCUSSION
The objective of the present study was to understand how
individual experts in rowing experienced the effectiveness of their
joint action when they rowed together at the first stage of their
team coordination learning process. To achieve this objective,
we collected the data related to their real-time lived experience
(i.e., at a pre-reflective level of the activity) and to the related
mechanical properties during a 12-min race. We were thus able
to explore the mechanical signatures of various shared lived
experiences. The discussion of the results is organized around our
research questions. The results first suggested that (a) the extent
to which rowers simultaneously experienced salient, meaningful
sensations of effectiveness (i.e., effective or detrimental) in their
joint action correlated with the extent to which supporting
a mechanical signature captured expert-like pattern of team
coordination. Secondly, the results also pointed out that (b) the
participants spent a large amount of their activity not having a
salient, meaningful experience of their joint action. These results
are discussed regarding inter- and extra-personal regulation
processes, respectively. We conclude by discussing the heuristics
of an enactivist approach to social coupling in sports science.
The Mechanical Signatures of the
Salient, Joint Experiences of
Effectiveness
When considering instances in which both rowers
simultaneously and similarly had salient experiences of their
joint action at a given instant, we obtained two samples that
reflected the identified collective phenomenological categories,
and that consisted of the measured mechanical parameters.
The first collective phenomenological category accounted for
simultaneous salient experiences of an effective joint action, the
second for a salient shared experience of a detrimental joint
action. The comparison of both collective phenomenological
categories showed significant differences within their mechanical
signatures. On the one hand, the pattern of the joint action
that was Simultaneously and Similarly Experienced as Effective
(SSE-E) showed that both rowers produced their peak force
at the same time and peak force levels were very close. On the
other hand, the pattern of the joint action Simultaneously and
Similarly Experienced as Detrimental (SSE-D) revealed that both
rowers produced their peak force in the same time, but their
peak force diverged in terms of level: the peak force of the bow
rower was higher than the one of the stroke rower. Interestingly
and consistent with what the rowing literature describes in terms
of what is expected of a rowing crew coordination (Smith and
Draper, 2002; Baudouin and Hawkins, 2004), the mechanical
pattern related to the shared experience of effectiveness (SSE-E
category) was more expert than the pattern related to the shared
experience of a detrimental joint action (SSE-D category).
Indeed, coxless pair-oar rowing requires a high technical level
as the force pattern required is more complex than in other
rowing boats (Smith and Draper, 2002): it requires a specific
pattern of application of the force due to the position of the two
rowers in the boat. In order to maintain the boat’s direction, the
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FIGURE 3 | Mean values and standard deviations for the gap between each individual peak force level in each identified subjectivity-based sample.
The gap was calculated by subtracting the peak force level of the bow rower with the peak force level of the stroke rower (i.e., a mean near 0 or negative is closest to
the expert pattern). SSE-M, Joint action Simultaneously and Similarly Experienced as Meaningless; SSE-D, Joint action Simultaneously and Similarly Experienced as
Detrimental; SSE-E, Joint action Simultaneously and Similarly Experienced as Effective; SDE, Simultaneously Diverging Experiences of joint action. Statistical
significance was set to ∗P < 0.05
stroke rower has to produce his peak force slightly earlier than
the bow rower does and with a peak force higher than that the
bow rower (Smith and Draper, 2002; Baudouin and Hawkins,
2004). In this light, our results showed that the gap between the
peak force level of the stroke and the bow rower was significantly
more important when the rowers similarly experienced their
joint action as detrimental, but this gap was inverted compared
to expert patterns (i.e., bow rower’s peak force level was higher
than that the one of the stroke rower). Joint sense making thus
appeared to be nested in the behavioral facet of the joint action in
that the extent to which rowers shared experience of effectiveness
was related to the extent to which their mechanical patterns
signed expert team rowing.
Moreover, while experiences of joint action were quite
accurate in terms of the mechanical states from which they
emerged (see the Section “Results” discussed above) our
results pointed out that these experiences were still capable of
improvement. Indeed, at a pre-reflective level of the activity,
the rowers did not perceive that their joint action states were
not perfectly achieved in terms of what is expected for a
coxless pair crew. Additional mechanical indices supported this
interpretation: the analysis of the rower’s peak force showed that
this peak was produced a little bit late by the stroke rower (around
1%; see Figure 4), as required in the rowing literature (Smith
and Draper, 2002; Baudouin and Hawkins, 2004). This finding
implies that rowers were not fully aware of the team coordination
patterns that shaped their joint action and supported their
lived experiences, suggesting that future research should address
avenues related to the unperceived features of team coordination
phenomena (e.g., Varlet and Richardson, 2015), especially how
these features can change through training practice.
In sum, the gap in the rowers’ peak force levels shaped the
emerging shared experiences of effectiveness, which indicates
that the interpersonal level of mechanical description was
the one that best accounted for the extent to which rowers
experienced their joint action effectiveness at the pre-reflective
level of their activity. Interestingly, by pointing out that rowers
managed the continuity/change of their joint action from
the interpersonal states of coordination they perceived, our
study indicates that an “inter-personal” regulation mode might
structure how each rower manages the joint action. The Inter-
personal mode of regulation refers to individual activities that
are synchronized through informational constraints relied on
by the given actors. For example, this mode of regulation is
implied in studies where participants are asked to synchronize
their oscillating limbs and to actively regulate the emergent
states of coordination on the basis of the extent of synchrony
they perceive on-the-fly. Such inter-personal regulation processes
have been investigated in lab-based studies regarding inter-
arms coordination between participants (Davis et al., 2016),
for inter-legs synchronization (Schmidt and Richardson, 2008),
or in natural settings regarding inter-oars’ stroke coordination
in rowing (Wing and Woodburn, 1995) or inter-players’
trajectories coordination in basketball (Esteves et al., 2011).
In terms of the experience that each actor has in his actor–
environment coupling, such a regulation mode assumes that
actors remain sensitive to the dynamic behavior of the partner,
and that they adapt in this regard, as found in the present
study from the analysis of the salient, meaningful shared
experience of joint action effectiveness. The following “Results
and Discussion” Sections will counterbalance such a conclusion
by suggesting that “extra-personal” modes of regulation might
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Representation of the force mean at the oarlock time curve of a typical oar stroke experienced as detrimental and (B) representation of the force
mean at the oarlock time curve of a typical oar stroke experienced as effective for bow and stroke rowers.
have shaped some remaining portions of the race (i.e., SSE-M
category).
While having an individual salient, meaningful experience
of effectiveness in a joint action did not guaranteed that
this lived experience was similar to that of the teammate
or that it was related to expert-like mechanical signatures,
our results supported the idea that when an experience
was shared, it was likely to emerge from an efficient joint
action. However, there was a notable size difference between
experiential categories (e.g., between SSE-M and the other
experiential categories). This difference in the size of the
collective phenomenological categories could be the reason it
was difficult to obtain significant results at the mechanical
level.
Participants Did Not Make an Extensive
Salient Experience of Their Joint Action
Beyond the analysis focused on the shared salient experiences
of different degrees of effectiveness, the analysis of the
phenomenological data provides elements to counterbalance the
“inter-personal” mode of regulation suggested above. To this end,
the prevalence of each typical mode of experiencing the joint
action (i.e., each collective phenomenological category) needs to
be considered. Joint action was perceived simultaneously as a
salient, meaningful experience for only 24,5% of the race under
study. With respect for this typical mode of experiencing joint
action as salient, of note is that 8.3% of which was associated
with diverging experiential content (i.e., the joint action’s degree
of effectiveness was simultaneous and salient but not similarly
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experienced), and 16.2% with similar experiential contents. In
the latter case, the rowers could simultaneously and similarly
report a salient, meaningful experience of a given stroke as
effective or detrimental to their joint action (i.e., SSE-E and SSE-
D categories), as extensively discussed in the previous section.
Finally, the results showed that, at the pre-reflective level of their
activity, the rowers did not pay attention to the effectiveness of
their joint action for the remaining 75.5% of the studied period,
indicating that the rowers did not make an extensive salient
experience of their joint action at the scale of the overall race (see
the distribution of the collective phenomenological categories
during the race in Figure 5). In other words, and as labeled in the
thematic analysis of the phenomenological data, the rowers were
able to coordinate their strokes through experiencing their joint
action as “meaningless” during a large part of their crew activity.
Thus highlighting that the joint action generally was not
explicitly lived as a salient experience within the dynamics of
the rowers’ activity might be considered unexpected. Indeed, by
revealing the prevalence of implicit team processes at the early
stages of a team coordination learning process, this result is
controversial in that it does not support the implicit coordination
process hypothesized by Eccles and Tenenbaum (2004) in sports
team learning, which viewed the learning of team coordination
as a linear process progressing from explicit processes toward
implicit and embodied processes. At least, our present findings
suggest that team coordination in rowing seems to be a task,
which can be performed by individual experts in rowing without
their exhibiting an extensive intentional/explicit activity of co-
regulation of their joint action.
With respect to the discussion about the modes of regulation
that underlie the present joint action (e.g., an “inter-personal”
mode of regulation), and in indicating that interpersonal
states of coordination were not the constant focus of the
adaptations actively performed by the rowers, our observations
now suggest that extra-personal regulation processes might also
have underlain the joint action dynamics (Millar et al., 2013).
Extra-personal regulation has been used to explain the emergence
of team coordination patterns while rowers were only regulating
their individual coupling to the environment separately. The
environment is thus used by individuals to mediate/organize
the arrangement of individual activities at each moment of
the collective activity. This process differs from inter-personal
regulation processes that are grounded on a direct co-regulation
of the joint action dynamics itself. When a rower is involved
in an extra-personal regulation and acts on his/her oar, he/she
can adjust his/her movements in response to the reaction of the
water and the boat information. Both rowers can thus respond
similarly, thanks to this mediation. Interestingly, as observed
within social insects that act together through environmental
mediation (e.g., termites, ants), such a process does not need
individual agents to be aware of the collective motion to which
they are contributing, which might thus explain the very few
instances in the present study where the rowers made salient,
meaningful experiences of their joint action.
Remembering that the analysis of the shared salient
experiences of effective/detrimental oar strokes suggested
that the rowers’ regulation processes were rooted in the inter-
personal level of organization, the additional finding notes that
the rowers did not make an extensive experience of their joint
action for a large part of the race. This finding thus suggests
that the rowers used an extra-personal regulation process to
regulate their coordination in the portions of the race when joint
FIGURE 5 | Overview of the repartition of the collective level of description of the lived experiences throughout the race.
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FIGURE 6 | Illustration of both of the suggested modes of regulation used by the rowers (From an initial representation proposed by Froese and Di
Paolo, 2011).
action was experienced as “meaningless.” One can then question
how the extra-personal regulation process suggested here can
combine with the inter-personal mode of regulation captured
earlier. We assume that, when rowing alone, expert rowers learn
to regulate their activity through the boat’s information (Millar
et al., 2013), which allow them to row with others using an
extra-personal mode of regulation, even if they have no prior
shared team practice. However, along the coordination process
under study, some events occurred at the inter-personal level
of organization (i.e., synchronization breakdowns) to which the
rowers were sensitive, causing them to exhibit an inter-personal
mode of regulation at the level of the activity that was salient
and meaningful to them (see Figure 6 for an illustration of the
two suggested modes of regulation). This latter mode, even being
less prevalent, might be the mode that they use to manage their
progression, the mode they use to maintain/change the flow of
their joint action effectiveness. Thus, to hypothesize what might
be observed later in the future stages of learning their joint action,
two alternative transformations might be evidenced: (a) rowers
will increase the proportion of cycles lived as “meaningless”
(i.e., SSE-M), thus signing an increasing extra-personal mode
of regulation of their continuous joint action. At the same time,
they maintain an inter-personal mode of regulation to manage
race events, evidenced through momentary salient experiences
of joint action effectiveness that is rooted in interpersonal
mechanical states; or (b) rowers will also gradually learn to
regulate the sudden events through an extra-personal mode of
regulation, evidenced through salient experiences of joint action
effectiveness that is rooted in the boat’s mechanical variation.
In this light, future research should investigate the extent to
which rowers are supposed to share more salient meaningful
experience through team training, considering the nature and the
transformation of the information that support such experiences.
Such research should be able to better challenge the Eccles and
Tenenbaum’s (2004) hypothesis that assumes a hypothetical
pathway from explicit to implicit regulation processes in team
coordination learning.
Interestingly, our study also revealed that when rowers
simultaneously experienced a salient joint action, their
experience was not necessarily similar. However, such
dissimilarities in the simultaneous experiential content did
not appear to link with any decrement in the mechanical
measures. Our suggestion is that, as long as rowers experienced
simultaneously their co-regulation of the joint action, the joint
performance did not suffer from each rower judging effectiveness
differently. This corroborates that team coordination patterns
of movement may occur without a perfectly shared experience
about the ongoing joint action (Bourbousson et al., 2011, 2012).
Other studies have indicated that joint action was quite resilient
to perfectly shared experiences, especially in those that used the
perceptual crossing paradigm (Auvray et al., 2009). This device
puts two actors in situations where they have to move an avatar in
a virtual environment populated by different entities (avatars of
humans and various lures), visually empty but providing tactile
stimulation at each encounter through the mouse used by the
participants. Interestingly, what helps participants to experience
social connectedness, and subsequently to succeed in finding each
other, is the ongoing co-regulation process they both perceived
simultaneously (Froese et al., 2014a), disregarding the extent to
which each actor was satisfied by the unfolding interaction, since
they have no feedback on their current effectiveness in the task.
In agreement with the findings obtained in such experimental
studies, the present study provided further evidence that the
full coordination of sense-making activities is not needed to
allow for a viable patterned joint action in a natural task, as
long as actors are simultaneously involved in co-regulating their
collective behavior (Froese and Di Paolo, 2011; Froese et al.,
2014a,b). Thus, as recently introduced as a hot topic in sports
team coordination research (Araujo and Bourbousson, 2016),
future research should consider the ways in which the extrinsic
facet of the coordination process (e.g., the behavioral facet) and
the phenomenological facet are mutually constrained to give rise
to collective effectiveness in a task. Regarding training concerns,
future research should consider how shared repeated practice of
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joint action (i.e., through the development of team coordination
expertise) might change step-by-step the relationships that shape
both facets.
Insights into Team Coordination Phenomena in
General
Beyond our hypotheses, the results of the present study offer
some insights into team coordination phenomena in general.
First, the team members combined two ways of regulating their
joint action throughout the race, namely a meaningless regulation
and a salient, meaningful regulation of the joint action. While
such a distinction has been proposed by Eccles and Tenenbaum
(2004) in their framework for team coordination in sports, related
research questions remain open to understand the effectiveness
of such regulation processes, as illustrated by the present results,
which challenge this theory. Second, the team members also
combined two distinct modes of regulation, inter- and extra-
personal. While such a distinction has been suggested in human
movement science (e.g., Millar et al., 2013), very little is known
about how both modes of regulation might co-occur during a
given ongoing joint action.
Considered together, these distinct regulation processes call
for three main avenues in team coordination research. Firstly,
research should question the settings’ characteristics that are
particularly propitious for one of these processes. For instance,
the environmental mediation possibilities might call for a
prevalence of extra-personal regulation. Also, the number of
participants involved in the collective behavior might make
the inter-personal regulation process hard to manage (i.e., each
participant cannot regulate all the dyadic linkages included in
the collective), so that extra-personal processes might become
parsimonious and preferable when environmental mediation is
available. Secondly, research should question to what extent
training practices could change regulation, and for which
benefits such transformations might occur. Thirdly, research
might identify the parameters that control how actors switch
dynamically from one regulation process to another during an
unfolding joint action.
Beyond the need for team coordination research not only
to focus on the behavioral facet of the joint effort, but also
to investigate the underlying modes of intentional regulation,
our opinion is that future avenues will benefit from considering
hypotheses included in the stigmergic theory of collective
behavior (Susi and Ziemke, 2001; Avvenuti et al., 2013) in which
holistic phenomena of coordination might be considered as
emerging from the behavior–environment coupling. Stigmergic
theory of collective behavior explains how each agent of the
social system regulates its own behavior–environment coupling,
without the agents needing to actively and directly coordinate
with other agents, and without them needing to be aware of
these cooperating agents. Of interest is that no evidence of such
processes has been discussed extensively in human collective
behavior. The scarce references made to such collective behaviors
(e.g., Bourbousson et al., 2012; Silva et al., 2014) have neglected
the stigmergic hypothesis and instead have adopted the local-
and-distributed mode of coordination, i.e., humans can exhibit
a patterned collective behavior without needing to grasp the
global properties of the social structure to which they contribute.
When considering that stigmergic processes do not require the
actors to be aware of the collective behavior (e.g., like social
insects that do not experience a sense of working together),
then stigmergic processes could explain why in this study, the
rowers were in synch for the three quarters of the race without
simultaneously having a salient, meaningful experience of their
joint action effectiveness. For instance, when the extra-personal
mode of regulation (i.e., stigmergic) is needed to become an
expert crew in rowing, it also seems to operate easily in a novice
crew (despite their intentional subjective regulation being shaped
by inter-personal processes). Such stigmergic processes could also
explain why the rowing training theory (Morrow, 2011) does not
consider the step-by-step adjustments of team coordination as a
time consuming part of the training. It could also explain why
rowing crews are often composed late in the sporting season,
because of members’ interchangeability are facilitated when
actors coordinate through the environment (in comparison to the
increased member-dependence obtained through inter-personal
regulation processes). At least, the present study suggests ways
for future research to delineate strengths and weaknesses of the
regulatory activities that facilitate the emergence of collective
behavioral patterns.
The Heuristics of an Enactivist Approach to Social
Couplings
Beyond our hypotheses and methodological aims, the results
of the present study provide the opportunity to explore the
potential of the enactivist approach to social couplings (Laroche
et al., 2014; Araujo and Bourbousson, 2016). We believe the
approach offers benefits to research in this area. First, this
framework is constructivist, linked to a dynamic approach to
behavior and to an additional phenomenological epistemology
(Thompson, 2011). The framework is concerned with combining
an understanding of team coordination from an external point
of view (i.e., mechanical measures) with an understanding of
the (inter)subjectivity that shapes/is shaped by this behavioral
facet (Petitmengin and Bitbol, 2009). The phenomenological
assumptions included in this framework were thus useful for
capturing in detail the actors’ experiences at each instant of the
joint action. By comparing the individual situated experiences
of the rowers, the researchers were able to characterize the
dynamic properties of team members’ participation in joint
sense making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007) and the specific
timing and sequencing of such lived experiences. As performed
in the present study, this subjectivity-based description guided
the subsequent processing of the behavioral data. In this
light, we used the lived experiences of rowers to delineate
various collective phenomenological categories and the related
behavioral samples sets that were then compared statistically.
This procedure, inspired by works conducted in the area of
enactivist neurosciences (e.g., Lutz et al., 2002), has been referred
to as a subjectivity-based sampling method.
The subjectivity-based sampling method provided three
opportunities. It allowed us to process quantitative and
behavioral data only, which de facto included the phenomenology
that prevailed in such data. However, as is usual in behavioral
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research, the processed team coordination data (i.e., the explained
variable) include mostly the experimental condition, specifically
external/contextual constraints that have been observed (i.e., the
explanatory variables). The procedure performed in our study
guided the mechanical analysis of the phenomenological data,
and thus ideally illustrated how a full enactivist approach could
be used with behavioral data. The subjectivity-based sampling
appeared to be a good method for interdisciplinary research.
Moreover, by including a phenomenological methodology that
uses retrospective interview techniques, the research design
permits activity to be studied based on the reconstruction
of the natural and specific conditions of the activity to
reveal how participatory sense-making develops in a real-world
setting. Finally, the present method instantiates the concept of
human movement as a place of interplay of behavioral and
phenomenological facets (Froese and Di Paolo, 2010), and a
concept of team coordination as a simultaneous combination
of the behavioral dynamics of a joint effort (i.e., non-accidental
correlations between the movements of the participants) and
participatory sense-making dynamics (i.e., each participant
constraining the own-world of the other). The present study
illustrates the interiority of individuals that is not always
captured by objectivist approaches. Here, taking into account
lived experiences helped to make sense of variability in the
objective data, and illustrated how this interiority might be
the starting point to describe actor/environment coupling,
including actor/actor coupling. However, the subjectivity-
based sampling method should be strengthened by future
research in order to better identify its domain of relevance,
that is the particular setting in which an elicitation of
actors’ lived experiences heuristically complements behavioral
analyses.
CONCLUSION
Our study leaves some open questions. In this study, extra-
personal regulation processes have been suggested for most of
the race, but instances of intentional inter-personal regulation
processes might also be suggested, as similar salient, meaningful
lived experiences of joint action effectiveness were explained by
mechanical parameters, accounting for an inter-personal level of
organization. Further research could be conducted with the same
methodology (a) to extend the heuristics of a subjectivity-based
sampling method and (b) to address the question of dynamic
changes in the intentional modes of regulation during races or in
more advanced training sessions. When one assumes that rowers
learn to be an expert team by actively regulating and coordinating
their activity based on what they experience as being effective,
then one can question how such behavioral changes may occur
without rowers having a pervasive lived experience of their joint
efforts. Thus, a promising question may be to focus on team
coordination training, first, by addressing how such a practice
may progressively change the saliency of the participants’ lived
experiences of joint action and second, by addressing how it may
change the behavioral signatures in which those lived experiences
are anchored. Together, these questions of interest suggest that
integrating lived experience with the investigation of joint action
is likely to improve our understanding of how actors regulate
their interaction in real time to facilitate stable and optimal forms
of social functioning.
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